Evaluating Harris Whiteness as Property--- Luis Mendoza
In "Whiteness as Property," Cheryl I. Harris builds her work on the image of her grandmother and her ability to use "passing" in her labor and daily life (1710). The main advantage of passing, as stated by Harris, is that it "[increases] the [possibilities] of controlling critical aspects of one's life rather than being the object of other's domination" (1713). At this moment, I want to focus on her functions of whiteness which comes after her discussion that whiteness is property through its theoretical descriptions. More specifically, I will digest one attribute of whiteness as property: "the rights to transfer or alienability" (1731).
One of Harris's points is that because theories surrounding property state that it must have the aspect of alienability, it makes whiteness as property more difficult to process. The issue is that "whiteness," as Harris states, "is incapable of being transferred or alienated either inside or outside the market, would fail to meet a criterion of property" (1732). Harris finds a loophole when introducing items like driver's licenses, which have been "conceptualized and treated as property by law" even with their inalienable characteristics (1732). She concludes by stating that property, like whiteness, which cannot be alienable but can still lawfully be considered "property," should be seen as an "enhanced value, rather than its disqualification as property" (1734).
I thought about an objection when I first read that whiteness could not be considered property because of its lack of alienability. However, in my thought process and conversations, it was difficult to formulate an argument because "whiteness" as a race/term is still debated through its fluidity in its intersections with nationalism and mixed-race skin color. My reasoning for pushing back, and I invite all of you to critique, is the historical and prevalent Pigmentocracy and mestizaje in Mexico rooted in colonialism and colorism.
I build my argument on the Spaniards' arrival in present-day Mexico and their destruction of indigenous communities through sexual and physical violence. Also, I wanted to relate this to Anderson by stating that the Spaniards set the norm for inequality of esteem and standing through being "white," which later manifested into authority inequality. In addition, they formed barriers to indigenous positive and negative freedoms in present-day Mexico. My argument is that whiteness can be alienable through the amalgamation of race, which touches on the point of "white-passing."
Going back to the term mestizaje, which means mixed European and Indigenous American ancestry but could also mean the closer you are to white proximity, the more secure and better your life would be in Mexico. The level of security and opportunities made through mestizaje forcefully made it appealing to oppressed communities, which led to many families having white babies with indigenous roots. These white babies, which can be seen through modern-day whitexicans' (Mexicans who have a white skin tone), went on to have a more privileged life than their parents/grandparents of darker skin tone. My point is that because being a part of the white race was/is needed because of its privileges, many have made it their goal to have white-presenting or white children, which in my opinion, makes white alienable.
Again, I invite comments to help flush my thoughts or understand the argument that whiteness as property is inalienable.
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ReplyDeleteHi Luis!
ReplyDeleteI really enjoyed reading your blog post and the way you outlined your thought process against Harris' argument that whiteness is inalienable. I think bringing in mestizaje and the events in Mexico adds complexity to this issue.
While I think you provide ample evidence that being white passing might accord individuals a higher level of security or more opportunities and lead people in Mexico to have more white babies, I don't think Harris would agree that formally or legally this makes whiteness alienable or transferable.
Harris states that "racial identity was governed by blood, and white was preferred" (1738). She explains that following the ideas of eugenics, law argued that this racial classification was objective and supported by science. Even one drop of "black blood" made an individual black. The point was to make sure that whiteness was not transferrable and accorded only to those deemed the superior class. Harris describes it as, "the standards were designed to accomplish what mere observation could not: 'That even Blacks who did not look Black were kept in their place'" (1740). I would argue that the more white looking Mexican children you talk about in your blog post may seem more white on the outside but Harris would argue that the law would not count them as white and therefore supports her claim that whiteness is not alienable.
She presents another example when she explains the arguments used in Plessy. Homer Plessy was arrested for trying to board a white reserved railway car. Plessy argued that "barring him from the railway car reserved for whites severely impaired or deprived him of the reputation of being regarded as white" (1747). He was trying to make use of the advantages and opportunities he could obtain from being white passing, as you also describe happens in Mexico. The Court denied him this claim saying that there was no evidence that he was incorrectly identified. Under the law, even if you outwardly look white the Court wouldn't protect the right to the reputation and advantages of being white passing. For this reason I think that Harris would disagree with you Luis, and remain planted in her argument that whiteness is inalienable, even if you may appear white.
I will agree with you and say that outside of the legal sphere it seems that Harris could be mistaken and whiteness is transferable or alienable to those who appear white on the outside. It is also very difficult within the legal system to set an objective standard for what is white and what is not, Harris says "case law that attempted to define race frequently struggled over the precise fractional amount of Black 'blood' that would defeat a claim to whiteness" (1738). While the law wants to exclude the ability of whiteness to be transferable they found it hard to set a standard to base all rulings on.
Overall I think you bring up a really interesting point and connection but under the legal framework I think Harris' argument that whiteness is inalienable is still supported.