Responding to Jemma and Aara: Another consideration that Rawls does not discuss--- Luis

 Hey Jemma and Aara,  

Thank you for the thought-provoking blogs! I definitely felt that Okin made her argument less favorable by structuring her last part of Chapter 6 with a sense of constructing a ladder of what social standing has a greater impact on "one's thinking of justice." I agree with you and Aara in that Okin's critique of the unequal gender-based structure is strong and needed to achieve Rawls's basic structure of a well-ordered society. I also believe that stating that gender is the most prevalent identity that will form an individual's concept of "justice" undermines intersectionality. I wanted to add another layer that is not accounted for by Rawls, which Okin hints on. 

After reading both blogs, I initially thought about our seminar where Kat and I argued for what Aara was discussing, a knowledge of the global racial empire, or in other terms, the history of racism and colonialism in the original position. I was sold on that argument until peers stated that we first need the conception of the veil of ignorance with the set-up of Rawls, where we can pick our "principles of justice." Then we can judge historical and current injustices, based on the two principles of justice, as "unjust" and in need of improvement. However, I also believe there should be more thought on the original position after reading Okin's critique and focusing on legitimate claims in entitlement theory as the social goals of society in our last tutorial. 

Professor Martin, George, and I talked through the thoughts behind a constitutional convention. One goal that Professor Martin stated would be on the agenda is the idea of an ultimate purpose for society. For example, one could be to preserve the community for future generations, but that presupposes a duty to human reproduction. The issue is that Rawls states that legitimate claims belong to a "political conception of justice" and is not "intended for the family." However, from the scenario, there has been a blend of family and the political sphere, which leave women with the "expectation" to take on the responsibility of bearing children. 

Rawls does state that there is a limitation on justice as fairness when discussing motivating individuals to take on responsibilities that are "most needed from a social point of view," such as free choice of occupation and fair equality of opportunity. But does that limit gender norms of responsibility, especially when society depends on generational compliance to take on the role of having children? The issue that is seen today, which Okin discusses, is that "the experience of being primary nurtures (and of growing up with this expectation) also affects the psychological and moral perspective of women" (106). Under the stated goal, there would not be a "choice of occupation" or "fair equality of opportunity," and Rawls completely misses this potential (modern-day) injustice. When Rawls discusses generations becoming secured through the original position, I don't think he considered children becoming indoctrinated by their "nurtures" who live under a system of social expectations that limit their opportunities, as Okin discusses.