PPE 2023

  Hey Jemma and Aara,   Thank you for the thought-provoking blogs! I definitely felt that Okin made her argument less favorable by structuring her last part of Chapter 6 with a sense of constructing a ladder of what social standing has a greater impact on "one's thinking of justice." I agree with you and Aara in that Okin's critique of the unequal gender-based structure is strong and needed to achieve Rawls's basic structure of a well-ordered society. I also believe that stating that gender is the most prevalent identity that will form an individual's concept of "justice" undermines intersectionality. I wanted to add another layer that is not accounted for by Rawls, which Okin hints on.  After reading both blogs, I initially thought about our seminar where Kat and I argued for what Aara was discussing, a knowledge of the global racial empire, or in other terms, the history of racism and colonialism in the original position. I was sold on that argumen...

The Okin reading, while certainly enjoyable and enlightening, presents a quite different lens for viewing Rawls than I had when reading A Theory of Justice. Okin levies a thoroughgoing criticism of Rawls’s perceived dismissal, exclusion, or lack of attention paid to gender structures in society. This critique has many facets, many of which have already been illuminated by other blog posts: Rawls’s reliance on a tradition that was certainly flawed in terms of its treatment of women, assumption of a just family, and emphasis on heads of family (presumably male, unless in a single-parent household) being represented in the original position, to name a few. But I don’t think these critiques quite detract from the utility, viability, or persuasiveness of Rawls’s theory.  Let’s start with Okin’s complaint about the assumption of just families. To be quite frank, I don’t really see the problem with that assumption. Of course, the family structure has not been historically just, but Rawls’...

In Chapter 5 and 6 of Justice, Gender, and the Family, Susan Moller Okin points out many ways that the family unit can impede the creation of a just society. One of the most striking critiques of Rawls is how Okin points out that instead of considering whether the family is just, Rawls assumes that the family is just and proceeds from there. For many reasons that I will briefly mention, this is a very dangerous and unfounded assumption. Rawls assumes a paternalistic view that assigns restricted liberty and inequality to children, which, as Okin describes, may work perfectly well for benevolent families, but is harmful in families characterized by neglect and abuse. Additionally, the current family structure and the expectations for individuals are shaped by gender. Rawls, assuming representatives in the original position will be representatives of a household, ignores the role of paid vs unpaid labor. Women are more likely to be expected to take on unpaid labor in child care and househ...

              In this blog I want to briefly outline Okin’s feminist reading of Rawls, and I will add in some additional thoughts about Rawlsian theory which Okin (and yesterday’s tutorial) stirred up.           Okin outlines three essential aspects of A Theory of Justice where Rawls illustrates that “Gender.. could no longer form a legitimate part of the social structure, whether inside or outside of the family.” (103) The first aspect is the essential liberty of freedom of occupation. To paraphrase Okin’s presentation of the argument, one could interpret Rawls’ naming of freedom of occupation as an insinuation that gendered effort within the family structure is untenable under justice as fairness as it fundamentally restricts the opportunities women are free to pursue in a just society.  The second aspect is “the abolition of gender… for the fulfillment of Rawls’ crite...

  I generally really liked this reading, and thought Okin did a great job exploring both how justice in the family is necessary for creating larger societal justice (and vice versa), as well as how the justice as fairness framework can be understood to pose the elimination of gender as a prerequisite for a completely just society. However, I want to call out a passage in which Okin unnecessarily minimizes the importance of race, class, and intersectionality on psychological development. This minimization limits Okin’s perspective to that of a white feminist, and leaves some of the implications of gender and its intersection with other identities unexplored. Okin brings up the supreme importance of gender, as opposed to other social identities, in influencing our psychological developments is when she writes” “The formative influence of the female parenting on small children, especially, seems to suggest that sex difference is even more likely to affect one’s thinking about justice ...

  Susan Okin creates a gendered critique of Rawls’s Justice as Fairness. While she does uphold its value as a thought experiment, she argues that the premises cannot permit justice if he fails to consider that society is upheld by gender constructs. Rawls views justice through a political, economic, and social lens. Through the social lens, he does consider family. Rawls does mention “family” in Justice as fairness, but only in three ways - all three of which Okin argues ignore the “internal justice of the family.” Rawls maintains that the family is an important social institution. Okin points out that “Apart from being briefly mentioned as the link between generations necessary for Rawls’s just savings principle, and as an obstacle to fair equality of opportunity, the family appears in Rawl’s theory in only one context:...as the earliest school of moral development” (97). Okin critiques Rawls’s consideration of family as he does not “...consider whether the family “in some fo...

      I really enjoyed reading Susan Moller Okin's examination of popular philosophical theories in light of feminist ideas. Based on her critique she comes to a set of conclusions about the political influence on personal and family life. The one I want to focus on in this blog post is, "it is invalid to assume a clear dichotomy between a nonpolitical sphere of family life and a public or political sphere is that domestic life is where most of our early socialization takes place" (Okin 131).  She argues that there is no clear separation between family life and public or political life because domestic life is where one learns how to be social and how to exist and operate in public life.      The key argument of this section is the examination of how we "become our gendered selves" (Okin 131).  She explains that recent theories explain the gendering of children as a affect of the gender of the parent. Okin cites Nancy Chodorow who argues that...

  Yesterday in the tutorial, we discussed children’s opportunities as a potential area that Rawls’ theory cannot regulate. In this post, I want to consider and think through that claim and pair it with Okin’s discussion of how Theory of Justice utilizes and leaves families (specifically children) unprotected.  Okin presents a strong argument that Rawls does not consider “the internal justice of the family” in his conception of basic institutions which satisfy the principles of justice. Okin notes that the family is only really mentioned in three contexts: The savings principle, which links generations of the family regarding obligations to future generations to save/preserve The family appears as a barrier to fair equality of opportunity (the inequalities between a Gates family member and part of a low-income family in Texas) Using the family as an initial tool of moral development Okin thinks the last context is where Rawls explicitly considers the family “as a just instituti...

          Rawls conception of justice as fairness provides an idealized formula for the formation of closed, well-ordered, and just society. Stating this much is simple, but I must pose the question, how does Rawls’ theory of justice account for the possibility that such a society could export injustices?            A society built upon Rawls’ two principles and crafted through the four-stage sequence would, rather undoubtedly, be a just and efficient society within itself. The four-stage sequence provides an effective process for organizing societal institutions, including mechanisms that ensure the difference principle is maintained and everyone enjoys equal basic liberties. The society that is formed around these institutions is of sound construction domestically and would ensure social and economic policy does not infringe upon citizens’ expectations or exploit them. There is still the question of interaction between s...

In Section 29, Rawls argues that one of his theory's advantages over utilitarianism is that knowing their basic liberties can't be violated contributes to people's self esteem. He quickly deflects the utilitarian counter-argument, which is that utilitarianism would require the publicization of Justice as Fairness if it were conducive to greater happiness, with one of the constraints from Section 23: publicity. Any principles chosen in the original position have to be "widely known or explicitly recognized," so that they can be "fully effective moral constitutions of social life," (115).  To me, this is one of the less intuitive aspects of Rawls's theory, and indicates something I found odd about the constraints more generally. Rawls derives them from his understanding "the task of principles of right in in adjusting the claims that persons make on their institutions and one another" (113). He cannot rely on the nature of this task, because ...

The most difficult part of criticising "A Theory of Justice" lies in the fact that it is an ideal argument, and Rawls acknowledges as much. In fact, he makes a concerted effort to emphasize this, caveating his discussions with phrases such as " It is clear, then, that the original position is a purely hypothetical situation. Nothing resembling it need ever take place." (Rawls 104) Many criticisms are nullified by this acknowledgement, as Rawls' argument is meant to provide an ideal to work towards, not an applicable, practical solution.  However, there might be some merit in criticisizing this idealization itself. Rawls' mission to design an ideal "well-ordered society" relies on a number of conditions and assumptions, one of which is that the thought experiments of the original position and the veil of ignorance take place at the birth of a society; in other words, Rawls' framework is not proposed as a corrective  solution to an existing socie...

     In this blog post I want to address the constraints on principles that Rawls proposes in chapter 23 and propose an additional constraint of my own.        Rawls presents 5 constraints for principles: they must be general, universal, public, order conflicting claims, and be final.      First he declares that principles must be general. He says that they must “express general properties and relations” (Rawls 113). Those in the original position do not have any information about who they are or their standing in society so they cannot use specific principles to support their positions. In effect they are “forced to stick to general principles” (Rawls 113). Another key aspect of general principles is that “they always hold” (Rawls 114) and people across generations understand what they mean. General principles are broad enough that those in the veil of ignorance understand them and that they are cross generational.      ...

  I thoroughly enjoyed our discussion with Taiwo and wanted to touch on some points. I wanted to challenge the constructive global project because of Aara's question on the emotional and physical labor of minorities, which the construction project requires. I will discuss my thought on Taiwo's points of liability and internal policing.  Taiwo challenged the view of distributive justice reparations by providing us with the lens of liability over collective responsibility. After giving us history that shows that many ancestral roots from all sides of the global racial empire contributed to slavery, I agree with him that "To build a view of reparations on these notions of binary groups identity and collective responsibility is to build a house on a sandy foundation" (118). If we want to focus on historical responsibilities, it would involve analyzing dark history that makes the question of "who is to blame" more challenging. Given these barriers, Taiwo want...

 Hi All! I thought last night was great--and Professor Taiwo was highly complimentary of all of you, afterward. Thanks for your hard work preparing and participating. Here are a few things I've been thinking about, since the dinner, that perhaps we could follow up on, today. Please also feel free to post your own questions and ideas, anytime before class today.  1. Norms as shaped by/shaping formal institutions : I was interested in what he described as his "broad" conception of "material conditions," where he seemed to be aiming to include the norm-guided patterns of behavior (and attention and concern they exhibit). I quickly read the essay he referenced, "Civility as Self-Determination," which is an argument for using li  to challenge oppression rather than valorizing "incivility" as a political virtue. A few suggestive passages: A society’s laws, coupled with the patterns of their enforcement, clearly structure and shape social behavior. ...

  I wanted to hop on this thread to discuss "Acting Like an Ancestor" ties to substantial change by building off the quote, "it often takes everything a generation has to win the struggle immediately in front of them. But if they can pass on the right things--and if we in the generations that follow pick up what they left for us--that can be enough" (200)." I first took a more cultural lens into this impactful concept that I agree will construct the "just" world. I appreciated Tawio for discussing the hidden history and practices of cultures of marginalized individuals' ancestry. Coming from a household of a culture outside of the United States, more specifically from Mexico, which is often hard to think about my history because it's not all good. However, I wonder to what extent Taiwo is considering educating ourselves on our cultural/historical background with our identities, especially where there are intersectionalities that could contra...

    I want to raise some concerns about the case Taiwo presents in the fifth chapter of the Reconsidering Reparations. Namely, he may not be considering several essential practical matters when it comes to the application of his arguments. A quick disclaimer should be issued before I start. These questions emerge because the system he has put forth could be an effective tool for corrective action in the Global North. For example, as George pointed out in his post, using unions, which have immense power in major American cities to collectively bargain and improve the system, and divestment are two easily conceivable methods to work toward our ultimate goal. The problem I am running into is not how to enact many of his tactics to chase down the targets he discusses in America. I am concerned about the feasibility of using them to address the international problems the global racial empire put in place. Ultimately, the nature of the case he builds in the fifth chapter d...

 As much as I have enjoyed arguing against the more abstract notions supporting Taiwo's moral framework and their implications for economic policy, the last two chapters of Reconsidering Reparations  have solidified the extent to which I generally agree with his approach, especially its implications for the practical political realm The tactics and targets he outlines are solid and seem to be appropriately directed at an academic/civil society-type audience. In terms of targets: unconditional cash transfers are, I think, the most important domestic policy imperative in the US; getting rid of tax havens is essential to any major financial project, either global or domestic; getting climate funding to the Global South is certainly necessary for decarbonization. On tactics, divestment is a great first step for those in the higher education system, as I assume most of his readers are, and unions using their considerable  (in Democratic states and cities, at least) politi...

 Hi Walsh, I appreciated this elucidation of the capabilities framework, and I want to answer your question about the 'subject change' challenge to the constructivist view as well as drill down on the idea of capabilities and its relationship to Taiwo's understanding of freedom, equality, and domination. Taiwo presents the 'changing the subject' challenge to the constructivist view mostly in response to anticipated objections from actual reparations advocates who do think of their work as addressing a particular wrong that was done to their community. I think the reason it appears somewhat frail at this stage in the book is that he has already done such a good job of showing how these particular wrongs are all just manifestations of a general wrong, that of global racial empire. As for capabilities, this was definitely the most interesting part of these chapters for me, and I share your affinity for the concept as Taiwo describes it. After the section you quote, Tai...

  I was initially not entirely convinced about the constructivist argument for reparations, as I always separated the “oppressor” from the “oppressed.” However, as Taiwo outlines, our approach to reparations and history cannot be black and white. He distinguishes responsibility from liability - the latter which he uses to frame the constructivist argument about the “who.”  Responsibility asks to draw out clear groups of moral agents and creates a “fault and cause” (122) premise. For example, if I let my friend borrow my computer but they spill a drink on it, there are clear moral actions and agents involved. My friend fried my computer and thus is responsible for the damages. However, this is complicated on a global scale. Taiwo spends the first two chapters explaining the Global Racial Empire - as one caused by the Trans-Atlantic slave trade - has shaped the present world we live in. These systematic occurrences with the entire world involved dissolve any definite person or a...