Considering Benefit and Cost of Family Institution - Walsh

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In Chapter 5 and 6 of Justice, Gender, and the Family, Susan Moller Okin points out many ways that the family unit can impede the creation of a just society. One of the most striking critiques of Rawls is how Okin points out that instead of considering whether the family is just, Rawls assumes that the family is just and proceeds from there. For many reasons that I will briefly mention, this is a very dangerous and unfounded assumption. Rawls assumes a paternalistic view that assigns restricted liberty and inequality to children, which, as Okin describes, may work perfectly well for benevolent families, but is harmful in families characterized by neglect and abuse. Additionally, the current family structure and the expectations for individuals are shaped by gender. Rawls, assuming representatives in the original position will be representatives of a household, ignores the role of paid vs unpaid labor. Women are more likely to be expected to take on unpaid labor in child care and household tasks that take away from their ability to work in the paid workforce, creating an economic dependence on men. This in turn changes the power dynamics in a relationship. As Okin puts it, "any discussion of justice within the family would have to address these issues" (95).

While Okin points out the flaws in the current family structure and the ways that justice can be fostered within the family, she doesn't want to abolish the family. Okin agrees with Rawls that the family plays a crucial role in development. The family is where children begin and develop a large part of their sense of justice and learn how people should treat one another. Rawls argues that "healthy moral development in early life depends upon love, trust, affection, example, and guidance" (98). Clearly, the family plays a very significant role in moral development and Okin asserts that raising a child to have a correct conception of justice relies on a healthy, co-equal parental relationship with shared roles, rather than a relationship characterized by domination and dependence.

While I have not read the entire book, Okin lays out that one of the ways to achieve this is by making the relationships within a family subject to the same principles of justice as every other part of society. She also talks about the private/public domain dichotomy of the family and how it is quite incoherent in practice. Before reading chapter 6, it is fair to say I had the belief, which comes primarily from intuition, that as much as possible, it is valuable to leave the family away from government intervention as its own private institution that is almost removed from government itself. However, this is clearly a problematic view. I wonder, where does this intuition, that some of you may share, come from? Are there any real values that you can think of that should make the family subject to different rules than the rest of society? Do you share the same conclusions as Okin?

Comments

  1. Aara NanavatyMarch 29, 2023 at 4:28 PM

    Hi Walsh! You bring up a great point. I would, however, have to disagree with you. Just based on intuition about family as we know it now, I wouldn't necessarily say that the government has entirely or should entirely be removed. For example, child protective services exist to respond to reports of neglect and child abuse. While I would not say that Okin's argument of looking at justice within the family through a gendered structure is akin to this at all, it is to say that the government does sometimes play a role in family whenever justice is at stake.

    An intuition against family might come from the fact that family is sacred and personal to many people. Family in itself, without gendered implications, would be something individuals, including myself, might want to keep private. However, Okin argues that the family structure we know now is structured through gender roles. These gender roles have been created in the political sphere - it is a place where the gender roles Okin argues are unequal come into practice. Thus, separating family as it is now from the public sphere is not as easy as it may seem. Okin argues that society as a whole perpetuated unequal gender roles and positions. Thus, everything inside of that system, which includes the family, is affected by that inequality.

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