The Political Role of Gender Roles- Dara Schoolcraft

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     I really enjoyed reading Susan Moller Okin's examination of popular philosophical theories in light of feminist ideas. Based on her critique she comes to a set of conclusions about the political influence on personal and family life. The one I want to focus on in this blog post is, "it is invalid to assume a clear dichotomy between a nonpolitical sphere of family life and a public or political sphere is that domestic life is where most of our early socialization takes place" (Okin 131).  She argues that there is no clear separation between family life and public or political life because domestic life is where one learns how to be social and how to exist and operate in public life. 

    The key argument of this section is the examination of how we "become our gendered selves" (Okin 131).  She explains that recent theories explain the gendering of children as a affect of the gender of the parent. Okin cites Nancy Chodorow who argues that "a child's experience of individuation--separating from the caregiver with whom he or she is at first psychologically fused--is a very different experience for those of the same sex as the nurturer than it is for those of the other sex" (Okin 131). For examples, lets say that there is a family with two kids, a son and a daughter, and the mother is the primary caregiver. The son and daughter will have two different experiences with identification because the daughter comes to recognize herself in conjunction with her mother who is present and of the same sex. Her brother on the other hand will identify more closely with their father who is absent and doing things that may seem foreign to a child. Chodorow concludes that this creates "characteristics in girls and women that make them more psychologically connected with others, more likely to choose nurturing and to be regarded as especially suited for it--and those in men that lead them to a greater need and capacity for individuation and orientation toward achieving 'public' status--can be explained by the assignation of primary parenting within the existing gender structure" (Okon 132). The gendered relationship of the child to their primary caregiver has an impact on the characteristics that they develop and exhibit. Using this theory as evidence, Okin makes the assertion that the stereotype that women are naturally nurturing and better suited for child rearing is false and is instead based on a cycle created by political and public sphere. When women are excluded from public and economic life and are pushed into the role of primary caregiver they create in their daughters the skills of caregiving which reinforces the cycle. This theory demonstrates that women are not genetically or naturally more suited to raise children but obtain these characteristics as a result of inequalities or being excluded from the political sphere. 

    The natural assumption from this discussion is that if the father were the primary caregiver and the mother was more absent, the characteristics that the children exhibit would be different than the ones given in the example above. I am curious to know what those differences would be and what would change if both parents were equally present and actively participated in the raising of their kids. I would love to hear if anyone has an guesses or intuitions on what would change or any other thoughts on the subject!

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