Okin's Feminist Reading of Rawls- Fina

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             In this blog I want to briefly outline Okin’s feminist reading of Rawls, and I will add in some additional thoughts about Rawlsian theory which Okin (and yesterday’s tutorial) stirred up. 

         Okin outlines three essential aspects of A Theory of Justice where Rawls illustrates that “Gender.. could no longer form a legitimate part of the social structure, whether inside or outside of the family.” (103) The first aspect is the essential liberty of freedom of occupation. To paraphrase Okin’s presentation of the argument, one could interpret Rawls’ naming of freedom of occupation as an insinuation that gendered effort within the family structure is untenable under justice as fairness as it fundamentally restricts the opportunities women are free to pursue in a just society. 

The second aspect is “the abolition of gender… for the fulfillment of Rawls’ criterion for political justice.” (104) When reviewing the functional representation of women within our current political system it becomes obvious that upholding gender roles deprives women of opportunities to equally participate in the political system. Under Rawls such inequality is unjust when considering the need for fair equality of opportunity within the second principle, and political participation being a protected right in the first. Thus, the abolition of gender in a Rawlsian society is a necessity for the existence of true political justice. 

The third aspect of Rawls’ theory that Okin calls upon in her argument is the emphasis on “the securing of self-respect or self-esteem.” (104) The implications of self-worth as a central value in Rawls’ theory are two-fold. First, independence from the need to rely on another person so that an individual may pursue their rational plan is a central aspect of finding fulfillment as a member of society, and as such, society secures their self-worth as a free and equal citizen. Second, gender roles in society assign one gender, predominantly women, “the need to pander or servilely provide for the pleasures of the other.” (104) Prioritization of self-worth would assure that a just society would not uphold norms that “gave strong incentives to

members of one sex to serve as sex objects for the other.” (105) 

Okin’s presentation of these aspects of Rawls’ theory led me to return to A Theory of Justice, where it seems as though an organization of society that secures basic liberties and maintains the difference principle must also allocate some expectation of freedom from work for citizens, as Professor Martin put it in tutorial. Following such a line of thinking the pursuit of leisure and participation in a society’s cultural elements would demand equality of time beyond working, and as such familial expectations of housekeeping and child rearing cannot fall solely on the mother. Additionally, such activities are undoubtedly beneficial to the creation of educated and active citizens. You can draw the conclusion that these must then be available to all in a society to pursue together. To me, this is an additional element of Rawls’ theory that Okin could call upon to further her argument. Beyond the feminist reading it also has interesting implications about the role of and accessibility to the arts and culture, along with workers’ rights. 

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