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 An Analysis of Property Rights and Equality - Dara Schoolcraft 

    According to John Locke in his book The Second Treatise of Government, property rights start with the individual. He says, "every man has a property in his own person" (19). The most fundamental part of property is the right of each individual to own and control their own body. It is this right that is then extended to create a property right in material things outside of the person. Locke describes an acorn or an apple that is gathered by a person as being their property because, "he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and hereby makes it his property" (19). Combining goods or material found in the natural world with labor combines the goods with the right to property in each individual. By mixing labor and goods a right to property is established and a distinction is made between what is a common good and what is now private property. 

    The way that property rights stem from a fundamental right to one's person, supports and adds depth to Locke's prior argument that all beings having a state of equality in the state of nature. He says all people "should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection" (8).  Despite just being equal and free from subordination, the right to property in one's body gives each person a tool to exercise their equality and freedom. One is not just free from the desires and actions of others, property allows each person to make choices themselves and have the means to do so. Initially the way Locke describes equality is a negative right. It is the freedom from the behavior of others. But when he adds the layer of property, equality can be seen as the positive right to use one's equality to establish property rights in goods. 

    The limit on property offered by Locke is a means of protecting the state of equality he lays out early on. He says that you can "make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others" (20-21). Each person is allowed to mix their labor with only as much goods as they can make use of. If goods spoil because someone took too much and wasn't able to use them they have done wrong. This means that if everyone only takes what they need and can use, there will be enough to around. This protects the state of equality because everyone has the right to a portion of the goods and doesn't have to be subjugated to the will of others in order to acquire goods. Limiting property to only what can be used for each individual protects each person from the actions of others. 

    


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