Hobbes’ State of Nature - Aara Nanavaty

By

 

Thomas Hobbes’s conception of nature ties into the modern international relations theory of anarchy. Both suppose that humans exist in a state of anarchy in which there is an absence of a supreme authority. With no “external impediments,” such as the absence of supreme authority, mankind has a natural right to freedom/liberty. There is no objective sense of what is right or wrong, or just or unjust. Thus, to Hobbes, this allows for a constant state of war that humans must strive to create peace in order to protect themselves, as he says, “...the first and fundamental law of nature, which is: to seek peace and follow it” (80). He lays out his conditions in a list of laws of nature, which he summarized as, “Do not that to another which thou wouldest not have done to thyself,” (97), which is essentially the golden rule principle; treat others as you would want to be treated. 


This reminded me of our analysis of King’s speech in the previous class, where he separates desegregation from integration. Hobbes’s writings: “From this equality of ability ariseth of hope in the attaining of our ends…” (Hobbes, 76) reminded me of King’s speech: “Freedom is the chosen fulfillment of our destined nature” (King, 20). The ability to make choices in one’s life is essential to having liberty. This creates an important distinction between desegregation and integration that King lays out. Besides the difference in means to obtain the two, Hobbes’s “equality of ability” correlates to King’s arguments in favor of integration. Desegregation occurs through legal processes that exist outside of the state of nature; integration goes beyond this, involving a change of the heart and mind found in Hobbes’s state of nature where individuals view each other as equals. In order to achieve true freedom, integration is needed to remove all impediments that disallow certain people from being able to make their own choices. Both King and Hobbes view liberty as the universal ability to make choices without those external obstacles. 


On another note, while reading chapter XIII of Leviathan further, I was unsure if I agreed with Hobbes’s analysis on human nature and interaction. He states, “Let him therefore consider with himself: when taking a journey, he arms himself and seeks to go well accompanied; when going to sleep, he locks his doors; when even in his house he locks his chests…” (78). Hobbes argues that in a state of war, individuals go through these types of measures in order to protect themselves, as there is a sense of untrustworthiness amongst one another. In an anarchic state of nature, there is no security. However, I wanted to challenge this by thinking about the same theories in a commonwealth society, where laws and regulations are created to establish a sense of safety. Could there possibly be cases where humans don’t “lock their doors” in a state of anarchy and do “lock their doors” even when safety is present in a commonwealth? The presence of danger may not entirely rely on what state a society is in (war or peace), but perhaps other factors, such as the type of environment one is in or the types of individuals one is surrounded by. In a state of war, could certain individuals perhaps form bonds that allow them to trust one another enough to not just have to look out for themselves? 

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Why Cowen and Anderson are both wrong-George

By
In their dialogue, both Cowen and Anderson fail to address important elements of each other's arguments. Cowen's failure is primarily empirical. He dismisses the significance of labor market monopsony out of hand (109). Although economists disagree about the relevance of employer labor market power, Cowen does not sufficiently address the credible evidence of its role in suppressing compensation. This evidence has only grown in the years since Private Government  was published. One consideration as to the relevance of monopsony is the pay-productivity gap. Although libertarian economists chafe immensely at any implication that workers do not benefit from higher productivity, and the popular understanding of the pay-productivity gap is indeed exaggerated, even the most pro-market economists are forced to admit to a degree of "delinkage" between the growth of labor productivity and the compensation of nonsupervisory employees. Interestingly, there is less evidence of de...
Read more

Responding to Jemma and Aara: Another consideration that Rawls does not discuss--- Luis

By
  Hey Jemma and Aara,   Thank you for the thought-provoking blogs! I definitely felt that Okin made her argument less favorable by structuring her last part of Chapter 6 with a sense of constructing a ladder of what social standing has a greater impact on "one's thinking of justice." I agree with you and Aara in that Okin's critique of the unequal gender-based structure is strong and needed to achieve Rawls's basic structure of a well-ordered society. I also believe that stating that gender is the most prevalent identity that will form an individual's concept of "justice" undermines intersectionality. I wanted to add another layer that is not accounted for by Rawls, which Okin hints on.  After reading both blogs, I initially thought about our seminar where Kat and I argued for what Aara was discussing, a knowledge of the global racial empire, or in other terms, the history of racism and colonialism in the original position. I was sold on that argumen...
Read more

Evaluating Harris Whiteness as Property--- Luis Mendoza

By
      In "Whiteness as Property," Cheryl I. Harris builds her work on the image of her grandmother and her ability to use "passing" in her labor and daily life (1710). The main advantage of passing, as stated by Harris, is that it "[increases] the [possibilities] of controlling critical aspects of one's life rather than being the object of other's domination" (1713). At this moment, I want to focus on her functions of whiteness which comes after her discussion that whiteness is property through its theoretical descriptions. More specifically, I will digest one attribute of whiteness as property: "the rights to transfer or alienability" (1731).              One of Harris's points is that because theories surrounding property state that it must have the aspect of alienability, it makes whiteness as property more difficult to process. The issue is that "whiteness," as Harris states, "is incapable of being trans...
Read more