Is Tacit Consent Enough to be Governed? Kat Lanzalotto

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I found Locke's view of consent interesting while reading the Second Treatise. Locke asserts that men join contracts and form governments to protect their property and ensure fair systems of punishment (and a common judge to appeal to). But, Locke's argument on consent to join and live under a government is subject to objections. Consent is a focal point of Locke's argument on government. Locke requires individual consent to form a government. In fact, he argues that men can become full members of society by expressing consent to a government. Locke's argument on tacit consent does not entirely convince me that most people consented to the government they live under. 




Locke's argument on consent leaves an important question unanswered: how can people born into a government consent to its rule? Locke argues that there is a difference between people who gave expressed or tacit consent to be governed. Expressed consent exists when an initial group  leaves the State of Nature and joins a government (agreeing to a government's rule). Subjects cannot revoke such consent; individuals who explicitly consented to a government can only unbind from the government rule when the government ends or allows the subject to revoke their consent. 




This compares to tacit consent, which Locke views as implicit consent to abide by the laws of a government that individuals are born into or living under (If a person takes advantage of a governments’ resources and protection, they must abide by the law). Locke writes, “By living all their lives under another government, and enjoying the privileges and protection of it, though they are bound, even in conscience, to submit to its administration, as far forth as any denison (122).” People can, however, revoke tacit consent at any time, leaving to form their own government, although they cannot bring any property which they acquired under the government they stopped consenting to. “To submit to the government, begins and ends with the enjoyment; so that whenever the owner, who has given nothing but such a tacit consent to the government, will, by donation, sale, or otherwise, quit the said possession, he is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other commonwealth (121).” Locke sees an action as simple as using a road built by a certain government akin to tacit consent to abide by the laws and governing of a state every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit consent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it … whether it be barely traveling freely on the highway (119).”




I take issue with Locke's concept of tacit consent and his assertion that it is legitimate consent to governing. Imagine driving across a country and coming across an unfamiliar road (a shortcut to your destination). If you take this road, which just so happens to lead to a new country, you unknowingly enter a new government's jurisdiction. Locke would see you as consenting to the laws and governing of that government, an expression of tacit consent. But how can you consent to a government which you did not knowingly enter? Furthermore, although people can revoke tacit consent, is there much choice in the decision? If you are born to a family who expressed consent to a government, you tacitly agree to be governed, by birth. But, if you want to leave the government you live under, you are faced with an ultimatum: continue providing tacit consent to the government or emigrate, revoking tacit consent but also leaving behind all of your property. Overall, I find it difficult to believe that Locke's idea of tacit consent, which under many circumstances does not appear to constitute consent at all, is a sufficient basis for consent to governing.  Locke does note the importance of consent in political obligation, but I do not find that his concept of tacit consent convinces me that the most people consented to the government they live under. 

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