Locke on property- George

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  Locke's view of property and the role of government in protecting it has always struck me as the biggest flaw in his understanding of the laws of nature. In the state of nature, Locke claims that a person has "uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person and possessions," and so government, established to enforce the laws of nature without the need for violence, can only be legitimate if it protects the liberty to dispose of property. Infringements on that liberty can only be for the purpose of protecting it, such as the imposition of taxes to raise an army. Locke's theory of legitimate government therefore does not allow the legislative to infringe on property rights in order to promote general welfare, something almost every modern state does.

I think that this results from Locke's reductive emphasis on "liberties" in his view of the state of nature and the reason that we choose to leave it. Humans are naturally social. We have always lived in groups, not just because we need to peacefully adjudicate threats to our freedom, but because doing so results in material gain. Early humans could hunt and gather more effectively when working together, and social institutions today improve productivity through technology and markets. Leaving the state of nature is therefore not only a question of preserving liberty, but of providing for group well-being. 

Using Locke's logic, it follows that legislative power cannot be merely an "authority to decide controversies," but must also be an active force for the material betterment of those who have consented to it. This includes infringement on property rights for redistributive purposes, as material goods are more valuable for poorer members of the community.  "The inconveniences of the state of nature" are not just violence resulting from a lack of centralized natural law enforcement, but also poverty and limited human flourishing. A government can and should make some people less free than they would be otherwise be for the purpose of remedying those inconveniences.


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