Locke - Property Rights & Inequality (Aara Nanavaty)

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 I found Locke’s tethered analysis connecting God’s purpose of giving mankind earth to a justification for property rights compelling (despite it being a heavily religiously backed argument rather than one solely based on reason). Whether one believes in God or God’s purpose, human beings have been put on an earth full of materials meant for human sustenance. He writes, “God, who hath given the world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience” (18). This means of appropriation accounts for human use of the fruits of the earth to help them live and prosper. This is done through means of labor, which Locke connects to individual property. If one has planted a seed, which produces a vegetable after farming (labor), that vegetable belongs to the person who combined the “seed” with their labor to thus produce something that is theirs. In a natural state, the world has been given “to men in common,” expressing equality, and mankind has consented to be in this position. 

However, the introduction of money complicates things. While money can justifiably be used, as Locke points out that everyone has consented to its use, it introduces the problem of inequality. Locke still upholds his argument of private property by recognizing the barter system. Privately owned land, which could be used for farming or factories, will be more productive than an overgrown forest that is not being utilized. Even if people have unequal amounts of property, everyone can benefit from production. 


However, in the modern world, unlimited acquisition of land could be possible - earth has a finite amount of material. While to Locke, there should be a limit on an appropriate amount of land that leaves some for the rest, more people now have sums of wealth that people in the 17th century didn’t have access to. People in the past with vast amounts of money were more focused on expanding physical empires and territories, which has been condensed to an individual/familial level now. The land isn’t solely being used for empires or production; people now obtain property for personal, exclusive use, or for investment purposes; people have more land than they can use/enjoy. With inheritance, people can also be born with more access to property than others (although the right to property remains the same). People have unequal access to the world - is it fair to have to tacitly consent to this?


We talked about tacit consent in the previous class, and living in a world controlled by money is something that people have to implicitly consent to. Children born into a commonwealth live there and have the right to leave if they are not satisfied with its government and go to another commonwealth. However, there is no other option to live in a world not controlled by money. Realistically, one has to tacitly consent to something they have no choice over. 


While I do not disagree with Locke that privately owned land can be more productive than common land, I feel as though the idea of consent is more complicated for property rights and money than what Locke argues.


Comments

  1. George AshfordJanuary 23, 2023 at 2:00 PM

    The relationship between consent, property, and inequality that you draw here is very interesting. The question of whether the super-rich today are really "enjoying" all of their wealth is definitely an pressing one, as well as how investment/capital fits into Locke's understanding of property rights. I interpreted the intersection of consent, property, and inequality, however, differently. I agree that Locke fails to adequately deal with inequality, but I think the problem is rooted in the idea of a property right in the first place, not in the claim that we tacitly consent to money. The opt-out for money is simply not to use it, which is impractical, as you point out, but not, I think, just because everyone else uses it, but because it is genuinely useful as a medium of exchange. Money is a helpful tool, and I think Locke is right to say that we tacitly consent to the use of a tool by ourselves using it.

    The issue with Locke's view is upstream of consent to money. He claims that the ability to accumulate property and wealth (unlimited due to money) should translate into an unlimited "right" to accumulate it, and that government cannot therefore act outside the interest of individual accumulation. He seems to ground this assumption in religion or by ascribing moral value to a theoretical state of nature, an exercise which makes no sense to me and which I think also comes from a religious perspective. I think the attachment of morality to the idea of "nature", rather than his understanding of consent, is Locke's fundamental error when it comes to property and inequality (and everything else).

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