Locke's Conception of Property

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    When Locke conceives of Earth as a common land given to all men by God, of which we all have an equal right to ownership over. How, then, does a piece of common land become the property of any one man? If they can work the land to produce materials essential to maintain the human condition, the land becomes private property. Through this system, no person may possess more than they can reasonably develop or hoard more goods than they can consume or trade. 

    Locke's argument fundamentally rejected the feudal system, which stipulated that rulers owned land and distributed it to vassals. The idea of common land in which all men have equal rights uproots the system of power the traditional aristocratic class of Locke's time relied on. Locke's ideals mirrored the rise of a landed class of common people. By extension, the birth of the democratic system of government centered around protecting natural rights, such as private property. Despite Locke's work rejecting unjust power structures of his time, his conceptions of the property could be used to implement new systems of injustice. 

    Locke's system was a logical step to ensure greater personal liberties than could be protected under feudal systems. There is a strong argument that governmental protection of private property cements into place a potentially inequitable, even unjust, distribution of resources, mainly if governmental laws create frameworks that favor particular industries or the accumulation of property. One example of how this can fail citizens is the American Rust Belt. The government artificially supported numerous industries. As they gained success, they accumulated land and industrial resources in cities, hampered competitors' ability to arise, and made laborers dependent on small firms for their livelihood. When these firms fail, they sell the property and industrial resources off and subsequently cripple citizens' ability to sustain themselves through labor, which, as Locke points out, is the central component someone needs to acquire property. I do not necessarily have solutions to the flaws that can emerge in a society that operates with Locke's conception of property. However, these issues are the center of many prominent debates in our society, so we would be remiss not to discuss them.

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