Locke's Natural State of Man & Law of Nature- Eva Pruitt

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 Locke describes the natural state of man as "a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature," (8). He argues that this natural state binds all liberties and actions simply by virtue of existing, distinguishing man's actual liberty from a "state of license," (9). While man has the facilities to act in his own freedom, he may not take liberty "to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession," (9). These bounds seem to govern the actions of man through what Locke describes as the "law of nature." The way in which he expanded from here was slightly confusing to me, but this is what I grasped as his meaning: 1) since men are all "equal and independent," they do not have the freedom to inflict harm to another's "life, health, liberty, or possessions;" 2) people are called to preserve themselves and "not to quit [their] station willfully;" and 3) because of the previous reason, humans must "preserve the rest of mankind," (with the exceptions of acting in justice on an offender or preserving oneself) (9).  His reasoning for this is mainly based in the ideas of people all being created without natural "inferior ranks" or "subordination" by and "omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker"- (I assume he means God here) (9). He argues that while people are subject to the business of God as their "sovereign master" and them as his "property," they don't get to hold that power over one another (9). This distinction leads me to understand that Locke's perception of God's will or plan is a part of his understanding of the law of nature limiting man's freedom. It seems slightly off-putting (to me, personally) that in the same section of describing freedom and license, he describes humankind as "property" to a higher "master." And while I do believe that the religious implications in this argument could be replaced with the idea of a government, that naturally creates a superior status for certain humans in a case where Locke is arguing that is impossible given the law of nature. I am wondering how others are taking this in terms of whether the law of nature exists without religious undertones?

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