Locke's state of nature and its remedies - Umer Lakhani

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The state of nature is one in which society is free to govern themselves, or as Locke puts it, “That in the state of nature every one has the executive power of the law of nature.” (Locke 12) The law of nature also dictates that no individual has the right to infringe on another’s life, liberty or property (which seems fair as the bedrock for civil society). If the law is broken, then in the state of nature, the injured party must themselves enact retribution. Locke (quite lengthily) details this principle as follows:  “Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the law of nature.” (Locke 10) 


However, Locke recognized that this is a dangerous level of power to grant the average citizen. Therefore, he asserted: “that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature,” because “selflove will make men partial to themselves and their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will follow.” (Locke 12) There is some evidence to support this. In Montreal in 1969, there was a police strike, which led to absolute chaos for 16 hours until the army had to be called in (reports of the event read like the movie script for The Purge, with death, looting and violence erupting like a mighty river, supressed by a dam, breaking forth). Similar scenes unfolded in 2017, when the police in the Brazilian city of Vitoria went on strike. These real-life incidents are the extreme manifestations of what Locke envisages will occur in a state of nature. 


As such, Locke acknowledges the necessary tradeoff between personal freedom and safety for one's property. In his view, it is rational to willingly sacrifice the freedom of the state of nature "by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it." (Locke 52) Although this begins as an explicitly consensual relationship, it changes once a new generation is born. Having grown up enjoying the security and benefits of the government formed by their fathers and forefathers binds people to obey the laws of that government tacitly, in Locke's opinion. This tacit consent can be withdrawn at any time, and the individual can choose to pledge themselves to another government, or start their own.


While I agree with all of Locke's views I have discussed thus far, it is the last point that I take issue with slightly. Although it is technically correct, the view that one can simply "go an incorporate himself into any other common-wealth; or to agree with others to begin a new one," (Locke 65) is too overly-simplistic in a modern context. In fact, it may have even been so in the context of Locke's time period, as it fails to take into account a number of factors that may hinder such a process. I think it may be more appropriate to suggest that one can choose to relocate to a territory whose rules and values are more aligned with the individual, although that too has its flaws. Both solutions ignore the cost of such a decision, both in terms of time and money. However, despite this shortcoming, I would agree with Locke's formulation of civil society and the relationship between a country's citizens and its government. Though it may lack nuance in some areas, it provides a solid foundation for a society free of the issues that arise in "the state of nature." In my view, it is the most solid foundation for a functioning, secure society.










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