Nozick on the Flaws of Distributional Patterns Typically Associated with Socialism - Umer Lakhani

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 I really found the latter part of "How Liberty Upsets Patterns" and the beginning of "Redistribution and Property Rights" to be the most fascinating parts of Nozick's Chapter 7 of Anarchy, State and Utopia. In particular, the section wherein Nozick clarifies that the whole point of the Wilt Chamberlain analogy is to demonstrate that "no end-state principle or distributional patterned principle of justice can be continuously realized without continuous interference with people's lives." (Nozick 163) He goes on to explain that any artificial state of egalitarianism would instantly be upset by people's voluntary actions; for example, the mere act of giving a gift would tilt the balance of total equality. The only way, therefore, in Nozick's words, to achieve a truly equal society on all levels is by constantly interfering "to stop people from transferring resources as they wish to, or continually (or periodically) interfere to take from them some persons resources that others for some reason chose to transfer to them." (Nozick 163) 

The obvious objection is that this constitutes a complete denial of personal liberty. Nozick acknowledges this, stating that nobody would be willing to give up this magnitude of their freedom, even to create a totally equal society. It is also unrealistic to expect people to keep track of all information (or even have sufficient access to such information) that allows them to distinguish which actions will and will not upset the balance. The fundamental problem with this understanding, to Nozick, is that "the usual theories of distributive justice are so recipient oriented; ignoring givers and transferrers and their rights." (Nozick 168) 

I find this argument very compelling. I think it is possible to synthesize, drawing from multiple passages in the chapter, a balanced view on how to create a fair and just society. The provisions laid out in "The Entitlement Theory" are crucial (that property acquired justly and transferred justly is the rightful property of their owners). Any property that is immediately in violation of these standards should be rightfully redistributed or taken away; that much is, I believe, easy to agree on. However, I find it equally important to maintain a sense of realism about these notions. As Nozick notes, total egalitarianism is undesirable for the degree of personal freedom that needs to be sacrificed in order to bring it about. Furthermore, we must decide how far we are willing to take this idea of "The sins of the father are laid upon the children." How much responsibility do we bear for the actions of our ancestors? For how long are we to pay the consequences of the atrocities of those who came centuries before us? I contest that all people, all civilizations, all identity groups of sufficiently long historical roots can find atrocities somewhere in their lineage. The crux of the issue, therefore, is to find the balance between distributive justice and individual rights. 

Comments

  1. Luis Angel MendozaJanuary 27, 2023 at 11:59 PM

    Umer, I appreciate how you broke down Nozick's main point of his "Entitlement Theory," and you raised interesting questions. I think the bike analogy by Professor Martin aided in imaging Nozick's thought process on a "just" transfer of property. The imagery made me consider some of the questions you pose. More specifically, the one centered around bearing the actions of ancestors.
    My initial thought was on reparations and redistribution of land/property in the context of colonization. According to Nozick, under his Entitlement theory, the property is rightfully acquired if "the property was acquired justly and transferred justly." Well, then we think about how the indigenous land was forcibly removed by European colonizers, thus not making it a "just" transfer of property. Now decisions are complicated when placing Nozick's theory under the modern lens. Especially when considering what you said about the probability of having "atrocities" somewhere in our lineages, thus making the transfer of property unjust.

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