Nozick on Property Justice | Eva Pruitt

I found Nozick’s interpretations a little dense, and wanted to outline my understanding of some of his points to see if

I’m grasping them accurately in application to his later arguments. In Nozick’s “Entitlement Theory,” he discusses

three main topics, or rules, on property as he interprets Locke. From the empirical issues, he draws three principles

of justice: 


1. “The principle of justice in acquisition,” (150):

He generally defines this principle as the ways in which the “unheld” can come to be property, the items that are
capable of being held, and the extent of such holdings. He emphasizes that this principle is not patterned, meaning
that the ways in which people can acquire property is not in one same dimension. He outlines the example that valid
ways to gain property (like gambling, receiving gifts, sharing, taking a loan, etc.) have no pattern in common, yet are
all valid ways to have property.

2. “The principle of justice in transfer,” (150):
This stems from how a person may transfer their holdings (or property) to another person and how one might
properly acquire that transfer. He uses the examples of gifts and exchanges to conceptualize this type of principle.
        He then outlines a threefold test of sorts on property acquisition:
       a)  “A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in acquisition is entitled to that
        holding.
        b) A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of justice in transfer, from someone else
        entitled to the holding, is entitled to the holding.
        c) No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 and 2.” (151)This outlines Nozick’s entitlement theory, which fuels his “complete principle of distributive justice,” which states
that “a distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess [according to the principles of justice
aforementioned] under the distribution,” (151). 

3. “The rectification of injustice in holdings,"(152):
I found this principle to be the most interesting as it raises one of his points that distributive justice should be
historical. He argues that if a past injustice shaped current holdings, that must be considered and corrected in order to
have a just distribution. This adds a prong to his entitlement theory, summing that if each individual person’s
holdings are just, “then the total set (distribution) of holdings is just,” (153).


With these three principles guiding his distributive justice arguments, he moves into the distinctions between

historically shaped principles and “current time-slice principles,” arguing that the latter are inadequate because they

simply judge the outcome without looking at the process. When I was reading this portion of his argument in addition

to the third piece of his entitlement theory, I immediately thought of reparations. Reparations are argued for in order

to essentially rectify injustice in holdings and they are certainly historically based. However, I’m not sure that Nozick

would agree with reparations at least if they were government distributed. He is adamantly against taxation, equating

it to stealing labor. But, what if the taxation were in order to correct injustices in distribution? Would he justify that

redistribution? 

Comments

  1. Hi Eva!

    I really appreciated the way you summarized and flushed out the details of Nozick's argument for his entitlement theory. It was really helpful to hear it put into simpler more digestible terms!

    I too, was curious about what sorts of things would be allowed under his idea of rectification. Your. idea of reparations made me think of two things. One, under the same veil, what would Nozick say about affirmative action? I think this would fit his account of rectification because he poses the question, "What obligations do the the performers of injustice have toward those whose position is worse than it would have been had the injustice not been done?" (152). This makes me think that he has considered and agrees with the fact that those who are in a worse position due to injustice deserve to be brought back to a semblance of where they would have been without the injustice. The goal of affirmative action is to make up for past the inequality and discrimination of minority groups. Based on similar intent I think Nozich would accept affirmative action as a means of rectification.

    The second thing your post made me think about is Indian land. Before the semester started I listened to the This Land podcast recommended by Professor Martin. In it they discuss the Trail of Tears and the tragedy of being forced off of their land to migrate to their allocated reserve. I think its interesting to consider what Nozich would think about this because they were given land elsewhere as a replacement but their home was unjustly taken from them. Would he think it was unjust and deserving of rectification because the land was not transferred? Or would the fact that the Native Americans were "gifted" land in a different area be enough for his account?

    ReplyDelete
  2. Hello Eva,
    First, you very succinctly communicated Nozick's argument, which helped me understand it and apply it to the Okin reading.

    Second, I like the question you posed about reparations. Nozick provides a direct justification for rectifying our nation's past injustices, but I am also struggling with whether or not Nozick would allow the government to redistribute the property. Suppose the government is not the proper body to oversee this. In that case, it must fall on individuals to voluntarily relinquish their property to atone for the mistakes their ancestors made. We know from our current situation that this is a somewhat unrealistic expectation. Your question exposes an innate flaw in Nozick's argument. If someone were to accumulate property or wealth through improper acquisition, the state has the authority to strip them of that property. Suppose the injustice was institutionalized and you were to allow for time to pass, such as slavery in America. In that case, I am hesitant to say Nozick would still support similar government action. The inequality at that point has taken root and created an untenable and unjust social hierarchy, but those directly subjugated and those who directly benefitted from the crime are gone.

    We can draw a connection between this question and Okin's objection to Nozick's theories. Okin argues that under Nozick's ideas on property and acquisition, a woman should own her child, which could create a sort of dystopian society in which children are nothing more than property to be used however in whatever way the mother sees fit. Forcing the woman to give the father equal rights to the child, as would happen in a traditional family structure, would be equivalent to stolen labor and unacceptable under Nozick's thesis. Nozick does not account for this and instead neglects to try to show why an argument like Okin's is incorrect. Okin's objection and the question of reparations show pressing issues in Nozick's arguments, as stolen labor is easily overlooked in many ways.

    ReplyDelete

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

Why Cowen and Anderson are both wrong-George

Responding to Jemma and Aara: Another consideration that Rawls does not discuss--- Luis

Evaluating Harris Whiteness as Property--- Luis Mendoza