On Locke and Hobbes Sovereign Power - Shaira Busnawi

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In Locke's State of Nature, everyone is born with natural rights to life, liberty, and property. He writes that men are naturally in a "state of perfect freedom," and that humans are born into equality with no power or jurisdiction over another (Second Treatise of Government, 8). Locke's State of Nature is similar to Hobbes' in the sense that the State of Nature is inherently chaotic and because of this, contracts need to be formed for the protection of these rights. 

In chapter 14 of Leviathan in which Hobbes states that men should “be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself " (Leviathan, 81). Hobbes essentially argues that men should simply renounce and transfer their rights to some common power in the defense of their lives and the protection of peace. However, unlike Hobbes, Locke argues that the rights to life, liberty, and property are inalienable and therefore, people cannot transfer them to any power. As such, the State of Nature plays a similar role in Locke's account of legislative power as Hobbes plays in his account of Sovereign power because it reveals what type of system is needed to correct the flaws of the State of Nature. 

For Hobbes, power should be vested in a single person or a sovereign. Locke, in contrast, believes that power should be vested in a legislative body which is the legislative power. In Locke's account of legislative power, consent must be mutual. Locke believes that until compacts are agreed upon and formed between the individual and legislative body, humans remained governed by natural law. Instead of simply renouncing your rights to a sovereign, Locke states that individuals must consent to the rules of society. The system that gives space for this consent lies in legislative bodies. However, I am not sure if consent plays the same role today as Locke would have liked when writing the Second Treatise of Government and would like to further discuss this in seminar. 



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