Property and Ownership - Umer Lakhani

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 To begin, Hobbes and Locke fundamentally disagree on the degree of property rights that one possesses in the state of nature. Firstly, Locke believes that everyone "has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself." (Locke 19) Already, this is at odds with Hobbes' conception, as he says that "every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body. And therefore, as long as this naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he be,) of living out the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live." (Hobbes 105) Fundamentally, we see a dichotomy here in Hobbes and Locke's conception of natural rights; Locke maintains that everyone has the right to life even without the existence of a state to enforce it, which Hobbes disagrees with. I thought about this in the context of last class's discussion, and I still maintain that Locke's conception is better in terms of safety and security, while I would deem Hobbes' conception to be more realistic.

 Locke believes that individuals can obtain property, so long as "he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own." (Locke 19) He gives the example of an apple tree, wherein the labor one engages in by picking the apples is sufficient enough to make the apples their property. Hobbes also seems to disagree with this. In the absence of a state to enforce property rights, Hobbes argues "that there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but onely that to be every mans that he can get; and for so long, as he can keep it." (Hobbes 103-104) This supports one of the conclusions that we arrived at last class: that the equality of everyone's physical and mental capabilities ultimately motivates us to contract for peace and forfeit some degree of total freedom in return for a legitimate authority (or "Soveraigne" as Hobbes calls it) keeping us out of the state of war. Without this legitimate authority, there is no one to enforce properly ownership, and therefore the notion of property is meaningless. 

Again, I have to concede that Hobbes' seems to be the more realistic of the two conceptions. Although Locke's is nice in theory, it lacks any mention of how to ensure that everyone abides by the same definition of property, or even respects others' right to property. I also don't think that Locke would necessarily disagree with Hobbes' suggestion that the state is the only way to properly regulate and enforce property rights. Locke himself admits that "civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature." (Locke 12). Central to Locke's idea of civil government is the notion that a properly formed state can carry out duties for its citizens better than the citizens could do themselves (i.e. law enforcement, the provision of public goods, etcetera). Therefore, it is not a massive logical leap to conclude that enforcing property rights is another one of those duties, which I find difficult to disagree with. 

Comments

  1. Shaira BusnawiJanuary 23, 2023 at 4:27 PM

    Hi Umer, great analysis! I wanted to further expand Locke's concept of property. Above, you mention that Locke’s theory of property lacks any mention of how to ensure that everyone abides by the same definition of property, or even respects others' right to property. However, I argue that his conception of property is formed under the assumption that everyone should, and does, respect each other’s rights to property. I believe this because in chapter 4, “Of Property,” Locke states that one would be foolish, and dishonest, “to hoard up more than he could make use of” (28). The reason for this foolishness is because in the state of nature, everyone has the common right to property and so if one hoards more than they can consume, it essentially takes away others’ ability — and therefore their right — to utilize that property (28). Because of a person’s awareness of others’ rights to property in the state of nature, Locke argues that one should only take what they need, for all property that gets spoiled is a waste. I believe Locke’s concept on property assumes that people in the state of nature understand to take what is only needed because anything more than that is disrespectful and dishonest to others as it infringes upon their rights to property. Furthermore, I believe that this respect for others’ property is a driving factor for the formation of political societies. In chapter 9, “Of the Ends of Political Society and Government,” Locke states that people come together and unite into commonwealths as a means to preserve their property (66). To me, people’s willingness to come together and protect what is theirs shows that people abide by Locke's definition of property, which includes their “lives, liberties, and estates” (66). Would love to further discuss this topic in class though!

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