Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, XIII-XXI; John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, Chapters I-IV

By Prof. Martin

 



  • What is Hobbes’s conception of the State of Nature, and what role does this conceit play in his account of Sovereign power?
  • What are the Laws of Nature, and what are their force? How are to understand moral right and wrong in the absence of a Sovereign power?
  • What role does the human faculty of reason play in our obligation to obey the Sovereign?
  • Why should we keep our contracts?
  • How do property rights arise, and what are their limits?
  • Why does Hobbes say the family, even in a state of nature, is a monarchy?
  • What are the differences and similarities between natural and civil laws? Between relations of dominion and relations of right?
  • What forms of liberty or freedom should political subjects care about? Does Hobbes’s conception of the liberty of subject adequately account for them?


  • What is Locke’s conception of the State of Nature, and does it play the same role in his account of legislative power as Hobbes’s plays in his account of Sovereign power?
  • What is the Law of Nature, and what is its force?
  • What is the role of consent in Locke’s account of legislative power?

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