Whenever I read about arguments in favor of distributive justice or affirmative action, there is always contention about the idea of the burden of proof. Although the two are different concepts, there is this notion, perhaps fallacious, that because both are unjustifiable in placing such measures to rectify past wrongs on people present today, on whom the burden falls. For distributive justice, property or wealth could have to be shifted from one group to another. In the case of affirmative action, as Harris points out in Bakke’s case, there is a belief that opportunity may be withheld from a certain group and given to another. These two undertakings, in the context of the United States, have fallen on the “innocent white.” I will, however, mainly be focusing on affirmative action in this blog post. The idea of the “innocent white,” struck me, implying that a sort of injustice has been committed against that group in order to create that specific term. If the “innocent white” of t...
As much as I have enjoyed arguing against the more abstract notions supporting Taiwo's moral framework and their implications for economic policy, the last two chapters of Reconsidering Reparations have solidified the extent to which I generally agree with his approach, especially its implications for the practical political realm The tactics and targets he outlines are solid and seem to be appropriately directed at an academic/civil society-type audience. In terms of targets: unconditional cash transfers are, I think, the most important domestic policy imperative in the US; getting rid of tax havens is essential to any major financial project, either global or domestic; getting climate funding to the Global South is certainly necessary for decarbonization. On tactics, divestment is a great first step for those in the higher education system, as I assume most of his readers are, and unions using their considerable (in Democratic states and cities, at least) politi...
The most difficult part of criticising "A Theory of Justice" lies in the fact that it is an ideal argument, and Rawls acknowledges as much. In fact, he makes a concerted effort to emphasize this, caveating his discussions with phrases such as " It is clear, then, that the original position is a purely hypothetical situation. Nothing resembling it need ever take place." (Rawls 104) Many criticisms are nullified by this acknowledgement, as Rawls' argument is meant to provide an ideal to work towards, not an applicable, practical solution. However, there might be some merit in criticisizing this idealization itself. Rawls' mission to design an ideal "well-ordered society" relies on a number of conditions and assumptions, one of which is that the thought experiments of the original position and the veil of ignorance take place at the birth of a society; in other words, Rawls' framework is not proposed as a corrective solution to an existing socie...
Comments
Post a Comment