Solving the Stag Hunt and Its Application to Warfare - Josh Morganstein

On page 111, Rousseau presents a scenario from what is presumably the state of nature: the stag hunt. A group of individuals is hunting a deer. If they catch the deer, they all get to eat. However, if one of them instead sees a hare, believes he can catch the hare and be adequately fed by the hare, “we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple and, having caught his own prey, he would have cared very little about having caused his companions to lose theirs” (111). In essence, Rousseau is describing the problem of defection. The problem is worsened when each individual recognizes that the others have an incentive to defect and catch a hare, ensuring that there is little chance they will not defect if they see a hare themselves. The outcome in which one of the hunters pursues the hare results in a worse outcome for everyone (even the one who gets the hare) because the stag is a high-value target with lots of meat whereas the hare is not. If the hunters coordinate, they can potentially hunt the stag and end up with a better outcome. Thus, the stag hunt differs from the prisoner’s dilemma (and in my opinion represents the problem of defection even better) because it is not only more realistic but it also has two Nash equilibria instead of one. The question then arises, how can one solve the stag hunt dilemma? In other words, how can one design a system so that the hunters pursue the more desirable outcome rather than defecting? 
The introduction of society clearly provides an answer, even if we do not know which answer. Whether it is through contracts enforced by a sovereign power (as in Hobbes), through laws enforced by an impartial and known third-party (as in Locke), through social necessity (Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, 114), or through morality (Rousseau, Social Contract, Chapter 8*), the social contract seems to at least address (if not solve) the problem of blatant defection in something like the stag hunt. But what about in the state of nature?

Rousseau doesn’t seem to offer nor want to offer a solution; he sees the defection as natural. Hobbes also fails to provide an effective solution. As we have discussed in class, Hobbes calls the man who defects on an agreement a “fool” because others will then come after him, or not let him into society once individuals exit from the state of nature. But this answer does not adequately address strategic (or subtle) defection. Consider Rousseau’s stag hunt. The hunters are stationed at their posts, not hunting in a pack. Let’s say Hunter A sees a hare, runs off, eats the hare, and then returns to his post (his hunting companion, Hunter B, has not even noticed that Hunter A is gone). While Hunter A was gone, however, the stag had run by his post and he thus failed to hunt it. Nevertheless, at the end of the day, Hunter B thinks that they just had bad luck, and they both must go hungry. Hunter A faces no repercussions for his actions, especially if Hunter B dies from starvation and never gets to the root of A’s treachery. Or, even if they are hunting in a pack, Hunter A could still defect, eat the hare, and never return, and Hunter B could die before exacting his revenge on Hunter A or telling anyone else about Hunter A’s treachery. Any system based solely on self-preservation with no consequences for betraying others (other than their reaction) will inevitably result in strategic defection. Locke’s provisos fail even more miserably to solve this problem; they are merely idealistic when, as Rousseau noted, the hunter that defects acts “without scruple” (111). 

Indeed, since society provides an answer, one’s natural reaction may be: why do we care about solving the stag hunt in the state of nature, if we do not live in the state of nature? We may not live in the state of nature domestically, but we do internationally. The international system is anarchic (or at best hierarchical): there is no higher power to determine who is right or wrong. Lockean-like provisos can be formed through consensus—such as the Geneva convention—but they are useless when a strong enough power ignores it (as Russia is currently doing in Ukraine). In the international system, might makes right, and thus the powerful can act, as the defecting hunter, without scruple in order to preserve themselves. With no reason to play by the rules if a country is powerful enough or if it can strategically defect, the equivalent of the stag’s hunt happens all the time. The dangerous implications of this international state of nature are two-fold. First, there is a failure to cooperate on issues such as climate change, where nations like China can defect by freeloading off the emissions reduction progress of the West. They can invest in green energy and reduce pollution domestically (touting those achievements to save face) while sending their coal companies abroad through state-backed investment into energy projects that pollute massively in the developing world. The second and more deadly is a state of constant war. As Chris Hedges noted for the New York Times in 2003, “Of the past 3,400 years, humans have been entirely at peace for 268 of them, or just 8 percent of recorded history.” And that’s a generous estimate. Solving the stag hunt in the state of nature—in other words, finding a way to align incentives against defection—is the answer to engendering cooperation and preventing war. 

Realists, often grounded in Hobbes, say that such an effort is futile and conflict is inevitable. Hunter A will always defect when he sees the hare. Neo-realists, often grounded in Rousseau, agree mostly with the realists, but argue that balance-of-power politics can help. If Hunter A and Hunter B both possess nuclear weapons, perfect information of each other’s actions, and are able to credibly signal that they will use nuclear weapons against each other if one of them defects and goes for the hare, then nobody defects. The problem is that miscalculation results in annihilation. If Hunter A abandons his post to go to the bathroom, Hunter B presumes Hunter A has defected and launches a nuke, Hunter A sees the nuke coming toward him and decides to launch his own nuke, then game over. One of the current fears in the international community is the exact equivalent of this scenario between the U.S. and North Korea, India and Pakistan, and Israel and Iran (if the latter proliferates). Liberals, often grounded in Locke, provide probably the most reasonable and realistic (albeit often ineffective) answer: iteration, as facilitated through institutions (rules of the game), solves the stag hunt dilemma. If Hunter A knows he will have to hunt with Hunter B tomorrow, and they agree to hunt in a pack (as established through the “rules of the game”), then neither hunter will ever defect. Feel free to comment on whether or not you think the liberal solution is effective, what other solutions you come up with, or anything else.

*The Rousseau passage from Social Contract I referred to with an asterisk above is: “The passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice, for instinct in his conduct, and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked.”