Constraints of the Concept of Right- Dara Schoolcraft
In this blog post I want to address the constraints on principles that Rawls proposes in chapter 23 and propose an additional constraint of my own.
Rawls presents 5 constraints for principles: they must be general, universal, public, order conflicting claims, and be final.
First he declares that principles must be general. He says that they must “express general properties and relations” (Rawls 113). Those in the original position do not have any information about who they are or their standing in society so they cannot use specific principles to support their positions. In effect they are “forced to stick to general principles” (Rawls 113). Another key aspect of general principles is that “they always hold” (Rawls 114) and people across generations understand what they mean. General principles are broad enough that those in the veil of ignorance understand them and that they are cross generational.
The next constraint is universality. Rawls says that “they must hold for everyone in virtue of their being moral persons” (Rawls 114). Everyone should be able to use and understand the principle and know that it applies to everyone equally.
Rawls then moves on to publicity. The principle must be public and the depth of knowledge about the principle would be equal to the amount of knowledge needed to make an agreement (Rawls 115). He identifies that more people knowing about and accepting certain principles leads to social cooperation and using principles as a moral compass to social life. He is clear to acknowledge that universality is different because it deals more with how “intelligently and regularly” (Rawls 115) the principle is followed. Publicity is concerned with the knowledge and rational acceptance of a given principle.
Following publicity is the ability of a principle to create order with conflicting claims. This constraint is concerned with “adjusting competing demands” (Rawls 115). He is concerned with what counts as ordering and how to deal with physical force as a way to create order. He concludes that ordering must be “based on certain relevant aspects of persons and their situation which are independent from their social position, or their capacity to intimidate and coerce” (Rawls 116). He highlights that the process of ordering must be based on things separate from social position which would give unfair advantage or coercive abilities to certain groups.
Finally, he argues that the system of principles are final. “There are no higher standards to which arguments in support of claims can be addressed” (Rawls 116). There is nothing higher than the system of principles to appeal to. What they declare is final and the end of the story. Rawls powerfully says, “we cannot at the end count them again because we do not like the result” (Rawls 117). There are no next steps, the result is final.
When put together these constraints help narrow down the conceptions of justice. Some conceptions may fulfill some of these constraints but not others. They all work together to take many ideas and concerns into consideration when examining these conceptions.
My one critique to the constraints that Rawls provides is the one concerning ordering of conflicting claims. I appreciate how he tries to identify and avoid means of ordering using physical force or coercion, but I think his argument about how to order more generally is lacking. The only guidelines he gives is to use certain aspects of people outside of their social position. What does this mean practically? What sort of things should be prioritized when prioritized? Why does one claim come first over another in an order?
In addition to his 5 constraints, I want to add one of my own. Principles need to be enforceable. All of the constrains that Rawls provides serve important roles but they mean nothing if there is nothing put in place to make sure they happen. The principles and the constraints they have need to be enforceable so that all of the great things they stand for actually happen in society.
I am curious what others think of the 5 constraints Rawls lays out and if there are any others that should be included.
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ReplyDeleteHey Dara,
ReplyDeleteThank you for outlining Rawls's five constraints on principles! I agree with your point that there is vagueness within the "creating order" constraint, which makes it unclear how to resolve conflicts. I wanted to add to your additional constraint and propose that Rawls could have touched on "enforceability" through his requirements of a conception of justice.
Rawls presents this idea of stability in Section 24, which discusses the veil of ignorance. When I think of enforcement, I question how a society obtains social cooperation. Rawls states that "An important feature of a conception of justice is that it should generate its own support" (119). Well then, the question is how? The image that Rawls paints starts with the original position since that is where the principles of justice are selected for the basic structure of society.
My first thought on how the principles of justice generate their own support was through the concept of justice as fairness. Rawls states that the principles of justice will be decided behind a “veil of ignorance,” which leaves no one advantaged or disadvantaged by natural chance and social circumstances. This is feasible given that within this hypothetical situation, the individuals choosing the principles for the free and rational people are presumed to not know their social standing with their possessions and capabilities (the original position). Justice as fairness gets its name from this process because it is a “fair” agreement reached by parties that were “rational and mutually disinterested” (12). This process ensures public acceptance, given the security of knowing the parties had no self-interest in the decision-making. From here, I imply that this is where social cooperation begins.
In addition, Rawls touched upon the impact of consistency in section 29 through the publicity constraint. Rawls states, "A conception of Justice is stable when the public recognition of its realization by the social system tends to bring about the corresponding sense of justice" (153). In other words, if individuals within the basic structure of society know that the principles of justice have been met for a long duration of time, then we start to see their compliance to follow those principles. Rawls adds that this outcome will depend on the satisfaction of the two principles of justice as fairness. For Rawls, satisfaction would mean that "basic liberties are secured and there is a sense defined by the difference principle in which everyone is benefited by social cooperation" (153). The thought is that if you are enjoying the benefits you obtain from a system (which satisfies the psychological law), you will willingly follow it.
Lastly, while I think Rawls could have been more explicit about enforcement, I can imagine his idea of the constitutional convention paints the foundation for the system of governance. I am interested to expand on this and get feedback during our seminar.
Hi Dara! Great post. I agree that Rawls’ concept of competing claims is one of the weaker aspects of his constraints of right and want to explore it from a slightly different lens. He proposes these considerations as reasonable measures to impose on conception of justice (or on any ethical principle, he notes) – aspects which parties must account for while determining the distributional scheme. Rawls notes that considering the job of principles of justice for assign basic rights and duties and determine the distribution of advantages, it is only natural that these requirements, which are “suitably weak,” will be satisfied (Rawls 113).
ReplyDeleteAs for the order of conflicting claims, I think the standard is limited by exactly what it can prioritize. Rawls introduces this requirement to his constraints of right because of the “difficulty… in deciding what counts as ordering,” understanding that principles of justice are desirable when they are complete (able to order/resolve whatever conflicting claims arise) (Rawls 115). Underlying Rawls’ ideas is the assertion that principles of justice should be able to resolve and order and competing claims which arise under the conception. If a certain conception cannot fulfill this constraint, there is reason to not consider it in the original position.
Rawls outlines the ordering scheme as “general and transitive,” meaning that id A I ranked more just than B, and B more than C, A is nonetheless more just than C. But, he recognizes the lack of ease in satisfying this constraint, discussing the way that physical fighting can also represent a means of ordering.
My concern with this constraint of right lies in the extent to which it can order within the principles of justice. While I understand the utility of this function for general ordering, like prioritizing equal basic liberties over the second principle of justice (fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle), I do not think it can order within those categories. What should happen when, within the category of equal basic liberties, two rights come into conflict? I think hate speech is the best consideration for this critique. When the freedom/right to speech comes into conflict with an individuals’ right to security and protection, how should those competing claims be ordered? Think about the Westboro Baptist church and the use of homophobic slurs at military funerals -- how can Rawls use this ordering principle to balance the prioritization of rights? There does not seem to be a mechanism in Rawls’ work to consider the prioritization of conflicts between basic liberties. I think this is an especially pressing concern since reasonable people often disagree about how things like equal basic liberties should be prioritized (whether hate speech should be limited, or if spending is speech and should face no limitations).
I also found Rawls' consideration of constraints to be very interesting and really important because it leads to Rawls ruling out certain principles of justice and suggests which principles should be chosen. His theory comes from a background that emphasizes intuition. With this in mind, the first three constraints of generality, universality, and publicity are all very intuitive and surely make sense as constraints. However, as Dara, Luis, and Kat point out, the concept of competing claims and the possibility for more constraints is certainly a weakness of Rawls' arguments. About Dara's claim, I am torn to whether I agree with the addition of the constraint of being enforceable. When I hear critiques of Rawls' theory, often times they are forgetting that Rawls' discussion is based in ideal theory. For this additional constraint of enforceability, I think this is still an important caveat. Rawls is not necessarily concerned with the applicability of his theories.
ReplyDeleteThis goes to the point that Umer made in his blog post about how Rawls' ideal theory makes it very difficult to critique without talking about the actual application of it. However, it is important to remember that while Rawls is staying in the ideal world, he believes that ideal theory is very important for actually understanding the real world. Therefore, it can be very valuable to think of the flaws in Rawls' theories in application. Even just staying in the theoretical world, I think Dara's point is still important. Principles of justice are not worth very much is they cannot be enforced.