Liability versus Responsibility (and can we mandate altruism?) - Umer
In chapter 4, Taiwo distinguishes between the two notions of liability and responsibility when addressing how reparations are to be financed. As responsibility is "closely tied up with a web of related concepts like fault and cause," it is the wrong lens with which to view reparations through. After all, "It's not, in the straightforward sense, the fault of present-day descendants of settlers or whites that other people's descendants have a harder time of things." (Taiwo 122) Instead, liability is a better way to justify those who are currently advantaged financing reparations because their advantages are owed to history, and to aid those who were not afforded the same stroke of historical luck is the right thing to do (again, not because it is their fault, but because they can, as a result of their historical circumstances).
I like this argument because it circumvents some common criticisms of reparations. For one, the notion of original sin is not invoked, as their is no assignment of fault or blame. It also avoids the issue of infinite regression. In this view, the criticism cannot be made that there is no point in looking to history to justify reparations, because one could pick a time further back in history and find evidence of the ancestors of the currently advantaged being disadvantaged and vice versa. Under the liability view, the major turning point was the global racial empire, and thus the currently advantaged should help compensate the currently disadvantaged in the interest of creating a more equal distribution of wealth and resources.
This argument also negates the commonly criticised views of reparations known as "harm repair" and "relationship repair," which Taiwo himself acknowledges. These commonly cited versions of reparations can be reduced to symbolic acts, or can further divide identity groups based on separatist rhetoric. Although Taiwo's constructive view has its own flaws (which he also acknowledges), it avoids the major drawbacks that the other views of reparations have suffered.
However, it might be interesting to consider the moral foundations of Taiwo's argument; namely, that it rests on something akin to altruism. The currently advantaged should help the currently disadvantaged because the currently disadvantaged did not have the same set of historical circumstances, and the currently advantaged are able to help better their situation. Inherent to this formulation seems to be some appeal to the spirit of altruism. Perhaps Taiwo assumes some universal shared level of kindness within all of us. In realizing Taiwo's vision, would this altruistic behavior/spirit really manifest universally, or would it have to be imposed to some degree? If so, can altruism really be mandated? Is it still altruism, or some kind of coerced facade of altruism?
I wonder the extent to which Taiwo's argument is built on a moral foundation of altruism, considering his view on reparations as an obligation rather than a "should." Under the liabilities approach, which you explained well in your post, I think that the moral foundation of altruism matches more to a responsibilities approach to reparations. The distinction I would make in your post, regarding advantage and disadvantage based on historical circumstances, is how those advantages and disadvantages came to be and what that matters to Taiwo’s argument. I think the global racial empire, created through history, which Taiwo describes in his first two chapters acts as a foundation for his argument, not altruism.
ReplyDeleteTaiwo writes at length about who is at fault and who should pay. But, he does not favor the “fault and cause” approach, “a categorization of responsibility that will vindicate our basic, intuitive connections about who is owed and who owes” (122). This consideration is moral, and as such, respiration and responsibility are common pairings (122). So, when I break my roommate's mug that she let me borrow, I am morally obligated to buy her a new one. But, Taiwo argues that this form of reparations is difficult when applied on a global scale because it is difficult to fully track patterns of domination. In this, Taiwo disagrees with the assertion that it is “the fault of present day descendants of settlers or whites that other people's descendents have a harder time of things,” and avoids the criticism of many reparations approaches for unduly blaming contemporary citizens for their ancestral wrongdoings (122). I find that altruism is the base of the responsibilities reparations approach.
You describe liability as the right thing to do, but I think this is a misplaced understanding which could lead you to assuming altruism is the moral foundation of Taiwo’s argument. Liability, as Taiwo outlines, has little blame involved; in fact, strict liability bypasses blame altogether and is merely a general obligation for people and corporations to “bear the cost of injuries in ways which bypass blame… entirely” (122). Unlike with responsibility when there is a clear moral agent and action which requires respiration, under a liability approach, there is no moral responsibility or publishing wrongdoers, but rather a question surrounding how to “build a world which distributes risk in the right way” (123). So, while people, corporations, and nations have an obligation to bear more burdens of constructing the new world order, this is not because of their moral wrongdoings throughout history (which would carry a foundation of altruism to Taiwo’s argument). It is because of the relationship between those entities’ advantages and the history of how advantages were distributed (and how accumulating disadvantages was avoided).
I do not think it is bad to consider altruism as an accompanying moral value attached to Taiwo’s argument. But analyzing it as an underpinning of his argument, I find, misrepresents his liability approach to reparations.
Hi Kat, thanks for the response. I think there's been a little bit of a misunderstanding. My definition of liability, and the resulting understanding that led me down the path of assuming altruism as an underpinning, doesn't involve blame whatsoever. As I said in my conclusion, there is no blame assigned; rather, the currently advantaged should help the currently disadvantaged precisely because they are advantaged, because history has favored them. They should help because they can, not because they are at fault. To me, this assumes some degree of buy-in from the currently advantaged, which in turn assumes some kind of universal degree of selflessness. After all, if your roommate's mug broke and it wasn't your fault, but you are in a financial situation to replace the mug while she is not, what other than altruism (or something very similar) could motivate you to buy her a replacement?
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