Rawls' Closed Well-ordered Society - Henry
Rawls conception of justice as fairness provides an idealized formula for the formation of closed, well-ordered, and just society. Stating this much is simple, but I must pose the question, how does Rawls’ theory of justice account for the possibility that such a society could export injustices?
A society built upon Rawls’ two principles and crafted through the four-stage sequence would, rather undoubtedly, be a just and efficient society within itself. The four-stage sequence provides an effective process for organizing societal institutions, including mechanisms that ensure the difference principle is maintained and everyone enjoys equal basic liberties. The society that is formed around these institutions is of sound construction domestically and would ensure social and economic policy does not infringe upon citizens’ expectations or exploit them. There is still the question of interaction between states that must be tended to. The justice attained within a closed well-ordered society is a vain achievement if similar justice is not secured by others. “The general awareness of their (principles of justice) universal acceptance should have desirable effects and support the stability of social cooperation.” If the goal is fair and stable social cooperation it seems an oversight to not acknowledge the responsibility states share in non-exploitation. Violations of the first principle or the difference principle in a third-party country, facilitated by the economic habits of a well-ordered society, are equally as egregious as any that may occur within an ideal Rawlsian society. It seems an arbitrary distinction for the Rawlsian to argue that vicinity determines obligations to uphold the two principles. I understand that a closed state is an effective means of implementing the ideal framework, but we should nonetheless strive to find a new reflective equilibrium that may correct for these shortcomings.
Taiwo advanced a similar argument in Reconsidering Reparations. “Rawls assumes major institutions are regulated internally, and thus that the justice of those institutions should evaluated as though they are part of a closed system.” The failing comes from what Taiwo calls an “artificial separation of countries.” I am inclined to agree with Taiwo. The existence of institutions that are beyond the regulatory reach of a single state is inevitable once societies are advanced enough. Thus, it seems necessary that Rawls may need to adjust both the original position and the four-stage sequence to account for the regulation of the advantages and disadvantages that can be distributed by global institutions. The answer is not a global democracy, but maybe a system that secures the democratic equality he discusses through widespread networks between societies which are meant to protect the lowest classes. Taiwo proposed localized collective bargaining and community control movements that operate on similar platforms which are derived from knowledge disseminated between groups. Rawls states publicity of his two principles justice is essential to ensuring they are maintained. I believe that adjusting Rawls position to ensure a global spread of the principles along with a global system of collaboration toward these goals could offset the necessary focus on using states to build and maintain the conception of justice as fairness.
Hello Henry/Anonymous Blogger,
ReplyDeleteNice blog post. Taiwo and Rawls definitely tackle justice from different angles. I'd like to offer a defense of the nation-state/close society framework that Rawls uses as well as categorically reject your assertion that “the justice attained within a closed well-ordered society is a vain achievement if similar justice is not secured by others.”
Rawls makes it clear why he uses the nation-state/closed society as his unit of analysis. He writes on page 128, “It is these principles, together with the laws of psychology (as these work under the conditions of just institutions), which shape the aims and moral sentiments of citizens of a well-ordered society.” The institutions Rawls refers to are political institutions, or social institutions that operate within a state. While Taiwo ultimately thinks reformation of economic institutions is needed to obtain justice (which he conceives of as global), Rawls lends more power to political institutions, and thus states. On page 132, Rawls also discusses the relationship between the principles, social justice, and social policy. Without a world state, global social policy cannot really be enacted, and thus we must rely on the nation state to engineer social policy in line with the just principles to maximize social justice.
Your claim that “it seems an arbitrary distinction for the Rawlsian to argue that vicinity determines obligations to uphold the two principles,” lacks charity in my opinion. “Vicinity” is a simplification; it’s rather the distinctions between different states, which as you note, Taiwo would call an “artificial separation of countries.” But while borders may be artificial or imaginary, their impacts are not. States possess different regulations, policies, and institutions, and those structures have profound differences on outcomes for citizens (not to mention justice). There is perhaps no better example than the 38th parallel. Using nation states as the fundamental unit of analysis is far from arbitrary; it’s in fact the traditional unit of analysis when discussing questions of justice in both political philosophy and international relations theory.
Finally, I would like to address your point that even once Rawls’ justice has been fulfilled in a closed system, that “[t]here is still the question of interaction between states that must be tended to.” You are completely correct, but that’s exactly why Rawls wrote Law of Peoples to apply his idea of the original position to the global system. In it, Rawls argues that states that have internally just constructs do not (or are at least significantly less likely to) treat each other in unjust ways. He points to democratic peace theory—the observation that constitutional democracies never wage war against each other—as evidence. Indeed, Rawls’ framework on the individual society level of treating every individual citizen as a free and equal moral person lends incredibly well to his global application in which every group of people in the original position are treated as free and equal peoples.
I’m not saying that I necessarily agree with Rawl’s conclusion and democratic peace theory. I’m also not saying that I don’t believe that Taiwo’s conception of the conditions for global justice are more realistic as they put more emphasis on economic rather than political institutions. However, it would be unfair to say that Rawls neglects global justice entirely or that there isn’t merit in his nation-state/closed society approach to justice.