Rawls' Idealisation - Umer

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The most difficult part of criticising "A Theory of Justice" lies in the fact that it is an ideal argument, and Rawls acknowledges as much. In fact, he makes a concerted effort to emphasize this, caveating his discussions with phrases such as "It is clear, then, that the original position is a purely hypothetical situation. Nothing resembling it need ever take place." (Rawls 104) Many criticisms are nullified by this acknowledgement, as Rawls' argument is meant to provide an ideal to work towards, not an applicable, practical solution. 

However, there might be some merit in criticisizing this idealization itself. Rawls' mission to design an ideal "well-ordered society" relies on a number of conditions and assumptions, one of which is that the thought experiments of the original position and the veil of ignorance take place at the birth of a society; in other words, Rawls' framework is not proposed as a corrective solution to an existing society, but guidelines for how to go about setting up a new society. It also relies on the state being a closed system, which as we have learned from Professor Taiwo, is just unrealistic. These ideal assumptions ignore (purposefully) the injustices that have occured throughout history and continue to happen. 

Another ideal assumption that Rawls makes is that individuals behind the veil of ignorance know effectively nothing about themselves, or any real life circumstances. As Rawls says: 

"I assume that the parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance. They do not know how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations. It is assumed, then, that the parties do not know certain kinds of particular facts. First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism. More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the particular circum- stances of their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the original position have no information as to which generation they belong." (Rawls 118) 

The point of this is to ensure that individuals arrive at principles of justice that are fair, and free from the influence of specific interests or oppressive instincts. However, the communitarian critique of this essentially rejects the idea that a concept of justice can be decided abstractly; they must be informed by considerations of local interests and culture. According to this perspective, we are born with existing social connections to particular people, institutions, communities, cultures and social roles. Our lives are unavoidably shaped by these connections that we had no say in. Even if we do our best to distance ourselves from the circumstances in which we were raised, we cannot change the degree to which our perspectives and attitudes have been shaped by the circumstances of our upbringing. 

There are many other critiques of Rawls' idealism, such as the feminist critique, but the point remains the same. What this boils down to is a simple question: Is it useful to explore ideal constructs of justice before, or at the same time as considerations about the much more intricate, nuanced and messy nature of the real world? At the very least, Rawls' exercise of the original position and the veil of ignorance is a reminder of our own biases and how they influence our decisions. There may be some value in abstracting away from special considerations, but how valuable is this when applied to practical cases? Can such ideal theories be useful in looking to solve the real injustices we face and their particular circumstances? I'd be curious to hear more thoughts on this. 


Comments

  1. Shaira BusnawiMarch 23, 2023 at 10:38 AM


    Hi Umer, I think it is super important to discuss how we can apply Rawls' ideal theory of justice to the real world. When I initially read Rawls I also questioned the importance of exploring ideal constructs of justice. However, after discussing this in tutorial and further reading, I want to offer some points in defense of studying Rawls' ideal theory. First, his conception of justice derived from the hypothetical original position is useful because it provides us with a way to evaluate how just a society is based on how well they align with his two principles of justice. We can ask ourselves if and how well the equality of fair opportunity and the difference principle are being upheld in societies. In this way, Rawls’ ideal theory provides us with a “benchmark” of evaluating how just a society is. Not only is Rawls’ exercise of the original position and the veil of ignorance a reminder of our own biases, but it can show us how we can mitigate injustices by being aware of our own biases. By adopting a stance like one behind the veil of ignorance, we are able to think critically about our backgrounds that inform our biases and consider the areas in society that can be more just. In practice, this can look like implementing programs or prioritizing policies that address the needs of the least advantaged members while promoting equal access to resources and opportunities. I am not sure if Rawls' theory of justice can go as far as solving real injustices but I believe that by exploring his ideal theory, we can have a better understanding to how we can come up with practical solutions that move us closer to the ideal, even if it may not be achieved fully.

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