Anderson and Protecting Democracy

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     Anderson’s writing in Private Government is similar to Rawls’ Theory of Justice. Consider Rawls’ two principles of justice. The foremost intention of these tools for crafting a well-ordered society is to secure a fair and just distribution of the primary social goods to ensure that regardless of identity, social circumstances, or any other factor, individuals can adequately develop their talents and pursue their plans of leading fulfilled lives. These ideals influence Anderson. I want to point to her emphasis on British workers’ struggle to secure workday limitations. Anderson argues that this was a natural reaction to the authoritarian nature of the industrialized workplace. Barriers to entry and exit were low for workers, so employers had no obligation to employ or grant basic privileges. The only actual course of action for the workers was a strike, which involved severe sacrifices on their part that the rich did not similarly suffer due to accumulations of capital. (59) Anderson’s goal is the same, and it goes beyond securing justice through equitable wage distribution. Anderson wants the least advantaged workers, the 25% of workers subject to workplace domination and the 55% without protections preventing their joining the 25%, to enjoy freedoms necessary to live fulfilled lives. (63) This 25% contains some of society’s least advantaged members, an injustice we should not tolerate in a fair society. In this matter, Anderson and Rawls share the same goal. 

To secure a free and functional republican society, we must legally protect workers from workplace domination permeating into our personal lives. To quote Anderson, “Free society cannot be sustained by people trained to servility and locked into strategic games where some individuals’ alienation of their liberty rights puts others’ liberties at risk.” (Freedom and Equality, 12) Any free society that legally allows for the domination of some workers, and the alienation of their basic liberties, will suffer the corrosive effects of such anti-republican norms as they permeate beyond the least advantaged workers. When seeking employment, if others are willing to subject themselves to violations of freedom, other workers will have to accept similarly exploitative offers to compete. Members of society are then subject to worse conditions, which often affects abilities to properly participate in essential societal practices such as raising children, political participation, and enjoyment of culture. Beyond societal participation, such conditions breed hierarchies that alienate members of society and prevent citizens from interacting as equals. (Freedom and Equality, 13) 

The foundations of our republic being eroded by workplace domination seems a far-off threat, but the reality is that we are witnessing a pivotal moment in America. Child labor restrictions are being eased in numerous states. When children are subject to basic labor, they are not being educated or allowed to develop themselves beyond this menial work. They are automatically disadvantaged and relegated to a lower socioeconomic status before they are even afforded opportunities beyond childhood. We witness union busting on our exceedingly progressive college campuses, not to mention its presence in most large service corporations. Listening to Anderson’s message will be pivotal in securing our republican values for future generations. 

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